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Abstract 
 The tough vs. weak strategy choice in a game of chicken provides the setting to gauge the 
impact of gender perception on strategic decision-making. Through the use of survey, this study 
finds that the indicated opponent gender did not have a significant impact on strategy choice, 
except in the case where male respondents were matched with a male survey. In this situation, 
male respondents were statistically significantly less likely to choose the more aggressive, 
competitive strategy. We attribute these results to wide intra-gender variation in strategy choice, 
as well as the strong dictates of masculinity in society. 
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Introduction and Significance 
Categorization is a basic tenet of human experience. In the early days of human history, 
categorization was a core thought process: distinguishing between foe and friend was essential 
for survival. Now, categorization is still a key tool in making sense of the surrounding world. 
Unfortunately the categories, like gender, that we use are limiting. Kramer (2011) describes the 
historic ideal man in the United States as “emotionally and economically independent, physically 
powerful, protective of women and children, and emotionally inexpressive with a strong 
heterosexual appetite. Traditional visions of femininity prescribed a nurturant, intuitive, 
vulnerable, asexual, dependent person.” (28)  Historic expectations pave the way for gender 
norms and dictate prescriptions for behavior. Today’s conflict on gender lines often stems from 
chafing against these expectations.  
The path to equality of the sexes eases some of these tensions, while highlighting others. 
We remain relatively stuck in the classic stereotypes attributed to male or female, and punish 
crossover. Sensitive family-oriented men are questioned as are more aggressive, career-driven 
women. Table 1 gives a telling look at the differing standards for male and female behavior. 
Table 1 
If a Person is Call Her: Call Him: 
Supportive Bright Yes-Man 
Intelligent Helpful Smart 
Innovative Pushy Original 
Insistent Hysterical Persistent 
Tough Impossible Go-Getter 
Cute and Timid A Sweetheart A Fairy 
Source: Adapted from Media Women – New York. 1970. “How to Name a Baby – A Vocabulary Guide for 
Working Women” In The Sociology of Gender, Laura Kramer. New York: Oxford University Press, 32.  
 
Women are widely expected to have a more communal, social-oriented set of behaviors, 
while self-interest and personal ambition is promoted in men. Clearly, the words used to describe 
females focus more on compassion and nurturing attitudes, while giving negative connotations to 
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the more assertive or masculine adjectives in column 1. Males are penalized in the same way if 
they act in a manner that appears more sensitive.  
Yet, to what actual degree is gender an important factor in decision-making and when 
does it come into play? A study by the Pew Research Center (Rampell 2013) found that “four in 
10 American households with children under age 18 include a mother who is either the sole or 
primary earner for her family.” However, Rampell explains that about half of Americans think 
that children are better off if the mother is at home. Only 8% think that children are better off if 
the father is at home. Horizons are opening up for women, slowly, but little adaptation has taken 
place in regards to the male sphere of influence. As we celebrate moving closer to equality in the 
workplace, some lament that “although mimicking men helped women move into workplace and 
find acceptance there, it also sent an unintended message to women: The traditional male role 
model was what they should strive for, and the traditional female role should be left at home” 
(Barnett & Rivers 2004, 9). However, leaving behind that female role has also been found to 
diminish success in the workplace.  Rudman and Glick (2001) explored the backlash effect for 
women in the job search, where qualified female candidates were penalized for their agentic 
behavior, like competitiveness and ambition, which violated prescriptive niceness. Their study 
found that agentic men were believed to have better social skills than agentic women and 
feminizing job descriptions penalized agentic women even further. Research has shown that 
successful women are less well-liked than their equally successful male counterparts in 
traditionally male domains (Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins 2004). Heilman and Okimoto 
(2007) built off the conclusion of this study to find that this likeability penalty was likely the 
results of violating gender norms for women by appearing to lack in communality. Women are 
punished for the very skills and traits that make them appealing employees: competence and 
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leadership skills. Men are expected to be self-motivated and ambitious, rather than communal. 
They have their own set of pitfalls, but fare well in the workplace.  
 Politics represents a field where societal bias can be particularly visible. Dolan (2014) 
notes that “If there are biases in the system, either formal or informal, or structural roadblocks 
that exclude particular groups or individuals, we need to know that” (5) in order to preserve a 
democratic system that represents all.  The inclination towards feminine compassion and care 
holds through in campaigns. We applaud strong women as role models, but want them to remain 
nice; campaign strategists typically advise female candidates to avoid attack ads and more 
negative campaigns as it is incongruous with public beliefs (Trent & Friedenberg 1995, p. 115). 
Voting is based on the candidate’s impression and evaluation. With the relative scarcity of 
female candidates to men, gender is pushed to the forefront in the case of female candidates. 
Jeffrey Koch (2002) found that potential voters used candidate gender to determine candidate 
beliefs for female candidates, but not male candidates; voters tend to assume that females will be 
more liberal. Despite efforts to redefine how gender characterizes us, our categorizations do 
matter at home, in the workplace, and in the headlines.  
Literature Review 
Modern game theory focuses on strategic decision-making in an ideal environment with 
perfect players. However, actual decision-making does not behave so neatly. Individual 
personality traits and characteristics have some degree of impact on how decisions are made. 
Expectations in regards to gendered behavior may also influence this process. 
Gender Perception 
A number of explanations have been theorized for gender differences in behavior. In the 
sociological setting, Kramer (2011) refers to gender as ‘the totality of meanings that are attached 
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to the sexes within a particular social system.” (2) The context used throughout this paper 
includes the cultural and social systems of gender in the United States.  Studies have posited that 
women are more socially aware (Eckel & Grossman 1998) and less comfortable in competitive 
environments (Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini 2003) than men. These results both support the 
gender norms of women being more communal.  
However, there is debate over how accurate these observed gender differences are and 
what they arise from. Deaux and Major (1987) wrote: 
Those who predict stable sex differences have had trouble accounting for the often 
limited ability of sex to predict behavior [in the laboratory], and for a variability that 
sometimes appears random. Those who argue that there are no stable sex differences, on 
the other hand, have had difficulty explaining widespread male-female differences in the 
culture at large. (369) 
Some theories suggest that observed gender differences are widely based on the power 
differentials between individuals, and that a patriarchal society leads males to have more power 
and appear as more competitive or competent. Women may appear to be more yielding not 
because of gender traits, but because they operate in a society where men hold a majority of 
powerful positions. Dominant groups maintain control “in part, by creating and perpetuating a 
set of cultural beliefs and practices that legitimate their power.” (Kramer 2011, 25) Behavior is 
reinforced by past experience and socialization. Thus, a large degree of gender differences may 
be due to social conditioning and internalization. Lightdale and Prentice (1994) found that 
observation had a significant effect on gender differences in aggression in a bomb-dropping 
simulation game. When participants knew their identity was known and widely broadcasted, 
males dropped significantly more bombs than females. However, with namelessness, females 
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dropped at least as many bombs as their male counterparts. When named, women appeared to 
comply with the gender stereotype of being less aggressive and more compassionate. Yet, 
deindividuation and freedom from social expectation, and thus retribution, led to comparable 
rates of bombings across gender lines.  
There can also be wide variation in behavior and characteristics of particular women and 
men. Meier-Pesti and Penz (2008) examined whether the widespread findings of women as being 
more risk-averse were accurate. They collected information on both subject sex and gender, 
classifying gender based on association with gender norms of masculine and feminine traits. 
They found that risk taking in investment behavior was not significantly different between the 
biological sexes when holding constant the association with masculinity. The key conclusion was 
that femininity was not equivalent to being risk-averse, but masculinity did support risk-positive 
behavior. Castillo and Cross (2008) found that on average men were not more aggressive than 
women, but that this result clouded wide variation in behavior within male subjects, namely a 
very timid minority of male respondents.  Schwartz-Shea (2002) found that high-achieving males 
and females behave similarly, while lower-achieving males resist their low merit status and 
lower achieving females accept their lower merit status in a sequential asymmetric game. In 
total, gender differences are apparent in some studies, but follow-up studies have found that 
controlling for other characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity can narrow or 
eliminate the variance between male and female behavior. 
Decision-making often relies on expected behavior, rather than actual behavior, so what 
society expects of males vs. females can be just as significant as any actual differences. 
Expectation states theory is a key social psychological theory relevant to categorization (Berger, 
Conner, Fisek 1974). The theory “suggests that gender is one of several ‘diffuse’ (or indirect) 
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status cues that influence expectations about the knowledge, ability, or influence of a given 
person.” (Roth, Purvis & Bobko 2012, p. 723) Expectation states surmises that we assume 
individuals will behave in the same way that an average member of the same category would 
behave, where categories are formed by cues such as gender, race, age, etc. For example, men 
and women overestimate risk aversion in others, but males particularly overestimate female 
strategic behavior in regards to risk (Eckel and Grossman 2002). As a whole, there is an 
expectation that women would be more risk-averse, unsupported by true behavior. Roth, Purvis, 
and Bobko’s (2012) meta-analysis of gender difference in job performance revealed that females 
scored higher than males on average for job performance ratings. However, males received 
higher promotion potential ratings.  They surmised that “promotion decisions, by their nature, 
often do not allow decision makers maximal access to performance information (because most 
candidates have not done the job in question), thereby creating more opportunities for increased 
weight to diffuse cues.” (725) Expectation states theory shows that gender may be an effective 
‘diffuse cue’ for behavior. In action, this means that gender is a factor that is “thought to suggest 
that females are more artistic and literary, kinder, and more patient and understanding, while 
men are thought to be more scientific, mechanical, and assertive.” (723)  
The application of expectation states theory within the context of modern game theory 
opens the possibility that judging how another might behave, rather than how they have already 
behaved, leaves more room for the influence of these cues in decision-making.  Making a choice 
in a simultaneous game, where no previous action has been witnessed, would seem to also be 
open to these cues. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Studies 
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 A prisoner’s dilemma game is the classic example for game theory, and is the format 
where much of the research over gender differences has been conducted. The basic setup for a 
prisoner’s dilemma involves two strategy choices, cooperation or defection. A sample payoff 
matrix for a symmetric prisoner’s dilemma game is shown below. 
 Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 5 , 5 -10 , 10 
Defect 10 , -10 0, 0 
  
If player A believes player B will cooperate, then player A would want to defect because 
10 is a higher payoff than 5. It also follows that if player A believes that player B will defect, 
then player A would also want to defect because 0 is a higher payoff than -10. Clearly, defection 
is a strictly dominant strategy for both players. This is unusual because despite defecting being 
the dominant strategy, it is not actually always in the player’s best interest to defect. With mutual 
cooperation, both players could receive a payoff of (5,5) which is greater than the payoff for 
mutual defection. However, the fear that the partner will defect while they cooperate drives both 
players to defect to avoid receiving the payoff of -10.  
Interestingly, studies have found that actual results vary from the predicted Nash 
equilibrium solution where both parties defect, despite it being the most logical outcome. The 
work of Butler, Burbank, and Chisholm (2011) found that women have a lesser preference for 
competitive behavior than men in this type of game. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found 
women opt to participate at piece rate rather than a tournament-style reward system for winning 
consecutive games more than men. This is also consistent with the idea that women have a lesser 
preference for competitive behavior, as a piece rate is a reward per game won, while a 
tournament–style reward only pays out to the ultimate winner of all rounds of games. However, 
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Ortmann and Tichy (1999) found that cooperation rates only varied between males and females 
in early rounds of the game. When played repeatedly, the cooperation rates of males and females 
converged, suggesting that prior experience shapes the decision to cooperate vs. compete.  Initial 
rates might differ because males and females as a collective often have different prior 
experiences that promote competition or cooperation. Orbell, Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea (1994) 
found that both males and females expected females to cooperate more, but that there was no 
relationship between expectation and the actual strategic behavior based on gender.  
Game of Chicken Studies 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma may be classic, but much of this study revolves around the 
Game of Chicken. An example payoff matrix for Chicken is shown below. 
 Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 0 , 0 0 , 25 
Defect 25 , 0 -50 , -50 
 
Chicken has a tough strategy choice, defecting, and a weak strategy choice, cooperating. The 
game also has two Nash equilibrium solutions. If player A believes that player B will cooperate, 
then player A will want to defect in order to achieve a payoff of 25 compared to a payoff of 0. 
However, if player A believes that player B will defect, then player A will want to cooperate to 
avoid the payoff of -50 when both defect, a disastrous outcome. Thus, using this logic from both 
players’ viewpoints leads to two solutions: both situations where one player cooperates and the 
other defects. However, these solutions don’t have equal payoffs. If player A defected while 
player B cooperated, player A would receive the payoff of 25. Player B would receive the payoff 
of 0 and be considered the chicken. Thus, a significant amount of tension comes from the 
question of who will be the chicken.  
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To apply the idea of Nash equilibriums, players “must have the correct belief about the 
other’s choice of strategy . . . the concept requires each to be confident about the other’s choice.” 
(Dixit, Skeath, & Reiley 2009 p.117) Yet, chicken is a simultaneous-decision game and in the 
real word, players must choose without knowing the others choice. Both players have a 
significant interest in avoiding mutual defection as it is a catastrophic outcome for both, thus 
they must navigate their own fear and greed to come to a decision. Therefore, assumptions about 
the behavior of opponents should play a role in strategy choice. With the prominence of gender 
stereotypes and issues, we believed that gender perception could be a key piece of information 
for decision-makers. 
The Present Study 
 Little of the research in game theory has examined the impact of gender on strategy 
choice in Chicken. The purpose of this study was to gauge if the interaction of respondent and 
opponent gender was a significant factor in their chosen strategy. Gender stereotypes predict 
certain dominant characteristics and expectation states theory suggests that we often make 
judgements about potential actions based on these classifications. Chicken seemed like an ideal 
set-up to gauge gender perception as the “tough vs. weak” strategy choice aligns with common 
conceptions of masculinity and femininity. We sought to understand if respondents were actively 
relying on these stereotypes to guide their decision. Our main goal is not to validate the existence 
of sex differences, but to see if these stereotypes play a role in the decision-making process.  
Experimental Design 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants (N=373) were recruited from four sections of an introductory economics 
course. This selection insured that participants were not previously exposed to game theory 
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concepts. The total sample was 53.6% male and 46.4% female, with gender being self-identified 
on the first question.  
Participants were asked to fill out one of three surveys located in Appendix A. The 
surveys were distributed randomly to all participants. The difference between the surveys is the 
highlight of gender in the setup of the ‘Game of Chicken’ in the third question. The question 
asked of participants is detailed below, with the three possible wordings in parenthesis. ‘Going 
In’ is the tough strategy and ‘Staying Out’ is the weak strategy.  
You’re playing a game of financial “Chicken” against a 20 year old (no qualifier, female, male) 
college student. You have two strategies to choose from in this game, going in or staying out. If 
you go in, and (your opponent, she, he) stays out, then you win $25. If you stay out, and (your 
opponent, she, he) goes in, then (your opponent, she, he) wins $25. If you both stay out, neither of 
you receive any money. However, if you both go in, both of you have to pay $50. No outside 
negotiation is possible. 
Given the situation described above, what strategy would you choose? (Circle one) 
o Go In  
o Stay Out 
Additionally, data was also collected on the reservation price for a lottery ticket. This 
information was initially collected in order to gauge and control for risk preference as a 
confounding variable. The information on reservation price was collected using the following 
question. 
In a lottery, there is a 10% chance that you will win $1000. What is the maximum price that you 
would pay for a ticket in this lottery? 
$________ (answer must be between 0 and 1000) 
 
Data 
  There were a total of 373 observations collected. The data breakdown of strategy choice 
and gender is summarized in Table 2. In the sample, 173 respondents were female and 200 were 
male. Of the total respondents, 165 out of 373, or 44.2%, chose the tough strategy. Along gender 
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lines, 73 out of 173 female respondents, or 54.5%, chose the tough strategy while 92 of 200 male 
respondents, or 46%, chose the tough strategy. Of the surveys completed, 126 indicated a male 
opponent, 125 indicated a female gender, and 122 were gender ambiguous. Table 3 contains the 
summary statistics for the raw reservation price data from the lottery question. 
Table 2. Gender Data Summary 
Tough Strategy = Go In 
 Opponent Gender  
Subject Gender Male Female Ambiguous Total 
Male 28 32 32 92 
Female 23 26 24 73 
Total 51 58 56 165 
  
Weak Strategy = Stay Out 
 Opponent Gender  
Subject Gender Male Female Ambiguous Total 
Male 45 31 32 108 
Female 30 36 34 100 
Total 75 67 66 208 
 
Table 3. Reservation Price Data Summary 
Reservation Price 
Minimum 0 
First Quartile 5.00 
Mean 46.83 
Median 10.00 
Third Quartile 50.00 
Maximum 1000 
Results 
A logistic regression of the data was conducted to examine the impact of the gender 
interaction variable on strategy selection. Only one gender interaction term was significant in the 
model, that of male versus male. The results showed that if a male participant received a survey 
with a male opponent indicated, they were less likely to choose the aggressive strategy of ‘Going 
In’ than if they received a survey with ambiguous gender. If the survey gender is male and the 
respondent gender is male, the expected log odds of “going in” decrease by 0.4745. This means 
that in this scenario, the estimated probability that the respondent will go in is 38.36%. This 
compares to the overall probability where 44.2% of respondents went in. The other gender 
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interactions were not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the perception 
of gender was not a factor in strategy choice. 
The coefficients and associated t-values for each gender interaction term are summarized 
in the table below.  The male respondent and unknown opponent gender are excluded as the 
reference class. 
Table 4. Interaction Model with No Intercept or Risk Measurement  
Gender Interaction Model 
 Coefficient Estimate Z value p-value 
Survey Unknown: 
Respondent Male 
(Reference Class) 
0.00 0.00 1.00 
Survey Unknown: 
Respondent Female 
-0.3483 -1.306 0.1914 
Survey Female: 
Respondent Female 
-0.3254 -1.264 0.2061 
Survey Female: 
Respondent Male 
0.03175 0.126 0.8997 
Survey Male: 
Respondent Female 
-0.2657 -0.959 0.3377 
Survey Male: 
Respondent Male 
-0.4745 -1.971 0.0487 
AIC of Model 520.8 
 
Discussion 
When survey participants were asked about strategy choice in a game of chicken that 
highlighted opponent gender, the results suggest that gender perception mattered only when male 
respondents were paired with a male rival. This might be due to the relatively high level of 
anonymity in the survey format. Behavior prescribed by gender is not as effective when 
unobserved and distanced from other players since these behaviors are social by nature. The 
decreased likelihood of choosing the aggressive strategy in the male-male interactions suggests a 
component of mutual deterrence. If a male subject believes, as conventional masculinity 
prescribes, that his male opponent is quite likely to choose the aggressive strategy, the subject 
has a strong interest in avoiding the catastrophic outcome and playing the weaker strategy.  
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The first question on each respondent’s survey asked them to indicate his or her gender.  
Gender priming in this manner has been shown to be effective in activating gender stereotypical 
responses (Boschini, Muren & Persson, 2012). The survey began this way to subconsciously 
place gender perception in respondent’s minds. However, in Boschini, Muren, and Persson’s 
study, men were more sensitive to gender priming than women. This could be an alternative 
explanation for why the male-male interaction term was significant while the others were not.  
Another point of concern was whether the opponent labeling in the survey was strong 
enough to trigger social cues related to gender. However, Cabon-Dhersin and Etchart-Vincent 
(2012) found that when strategy labeling is changed, it lead to a change in rates of strategy 
selection. Specifically, a socially-oriented strategy label (like cooperate or do not cooperate) 
rather than a neutral (Red or Blue) led to slightly higher rates of cooperation for both genders, 
but significantly higher cooperation rates for women in a game of chicken. The results of the 
former study indicated that subtle changes in strategy wording could have an observable impact 
on strategy choice which led us to believe that the gender labeling in our surveys would be 
sufficient enough to register in participant’s minds. This suggests the possibility that the non-
significance of gender interaction was not from lack of participant awareness, but from 
participants not holding opponent gender as an important factor in strategy selection.  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the literature suggests that there are observable gender differences in behavior on 
average, but that controlling for other gender-related factors can reduce the size of the difference.  
However, regardless of the actual state of gendered behavior, society has strong expectations 
along gender lines. Numerous studies found that women were more socially-oriented in decision-
making (Eckel & Grossman 1998) and less comfortable in competitive situations (Butler, 
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Burbank, & Chisholm 2011; Niederle & Vesterlund 2007). However, a number of counter 
studies were able to negate the differences by de-emphasizing self-awareness (Lightdale & 
Prentice 1994) or controlling for masculine and feminine trait association rather than just gender 
identification (Meier-Pesti & Penz 2008). However, despite the conflicting evidence on true 
gender differences in behavior, previous studies found strong evidence that there are differences 
in expectation based on gender. Eckel and Grossman (2002) found that men strongly 
overestimate women’s risk aversion and that women are trusted to cooperate more than men by 
rivals of both gender (Orbell, Dawes & Schwartz-Shea 1994).  
 The results obtained in this study indicate that gender perception was only influential 
when male respondents were paired with male surveys. A male-male interaction led to a 
decreased likelihood that the respondent would select the tough strategy suggesting a component 
of mutual deterrence. This study could be improved by offering true financial incentives to better 
gauge behavior closer to a real-world situation. In addition, a more interactive study format 
might yield stronger results because participant interaction could trigger greater social cues and 
awareness than the survey format did.  
 It is easy to find evidences of gender differences in society, looking at concentrations in 
various careers or the gender makeup of leadership roles in major companies. Expectations about 
gendered behavior are shaping which fields men and women enter, and how they are promoted 
and reviewed. Understanding at what level gender perception shapes our decisions is significant 
because it helps reveal the bias that influences our judgment in decision-making, and if it is 
justified. The results suggest that the idealized male role, held to be more aggressive, still 
dominates in the male mind, but that perhaps restrictive gender expectations for females have 
loosened.   
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Appendix 
Survey Instrument A 
Reminder: Participation in this study is voluntary. Participation will have no impact on your 
course grade. You can choose to discontinue this survey at any time without penalty. 
1. What is your gender? (Circle one) 
o Male 
o Female 
 
2. In a lottery, there is a 10% chance that you will win $1000. What is the maximum price 
that you would pay for a ticket in this lottery? 
$________ (answer must be between 0 and 1000) 
 
3. You’re playing a game of financial “Chicken” against a 20 year old college student. You 
have two strategies to choose from in this game, going in or staying out. If you go in, and 
your opponent stays out, then you win $25. If you stay out, and your opponent goes in, 
then your opponent wins $25. If you both stay out, neither of you receive any money. 
However, if you both go in, both of you have to pay $50. No outside negotiation is 
possible. 
Given the situation described above, what strategy would you choose? (Circle one) 
o Go In  
o Stay Out 
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Survey Instrument B 
Reminder: Participation in this study is voluntary. Participation will have no impact on your 
course grade. You can choose to discontinue this survey at any time without penalty. 
 
1. What is your gender? (Circle one) 
o Male 
o Female 
 
2. In a lottery, there is a 10% chance that you will win $1000. What is the maximum price 
that you would pay for a ticket in this lottery? 
$________ (answer must be between 0 and 1000) 
 
3. You’re playing a game of financial “Chicken” against a 20 year old female college 
student. You have two strategies to choose from in this game, going in or staying out. If 
you go in, and she stays out, then you win $25. If you stay out, and she goes in, then 
she wins $25. If you both stay out, neither of you receive any money. However, if you 
both go in, both of you have to pay $50. No outside negotiation is possible. 
Given the situation described above, what strategy would you choose? (Circle one) 
o Go In  
o Stay Out 
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Survey Instrument C 
Reminder: Participation in this study is voluntary. Participation will have no impact on your 
course grade. You can choose to discontinue this survey at any time without penalty. 
1. What is your gender? (Circle one) 
o Male 
o Female 
 
2. In a lottery, there is a 10% chance that you will win $1000. What is the maximum price 
that you would pay for a ticket in this lottery? 
$________ (answer must be between 0 and 1000) 
 
3. You’re playing a game of financial “Chicken” against a 20 year old male college student. 
You have two strategies to choose from in this game, going in or staying out. If you go 
in, and he stays out, then you win $25. If you stay out, and he goes in, then he wins $25. 
If you both stay out, neither of you receive any money. However, if you both go in, both 
of you have to pay $50. No outside negotiation is possible.  
Given the situation described above, what strategy would you choose? (Circle one) 
o Go In  
o Stay Out 
 
